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Abstract
In this article,1 we challenge the (implicit) dogmas of the current trend towards a
business rescue culture within Europe.2 It is unclear why this trend – as a logical
consequence of the desire to create increasingly debtor friendly insolvency regimes
– keeps revealing and reinforcing itself in this time frame. Many different ap-
proaches take this concept for granted. The idea thus risks becoming an end in it-
self. The assumptions behind the current trend of business rescue culture should
reﬂect the stylized facts of a ﬁrm embedded in its business ecology. An implicit
dogma of current business rescue culture is that a ﬁrm is an entity that must survive
and will create value indeﬁnitely and, accordingly, deserves a second chance.
However, the ability to create value and therefore the viability of a ﬁrm are the
outcome of an uncertain economic process. Capitalism is a process of trial and er-
ror. Failure is a normal outcome and should be considered an essential part of cap-
italism. In general, the life span of ﬁrms is ﬁnite because they have to cope with
many uncertainties and trade-offs. The ﬁrm itself is only a tiny temporary (legal)
shell within a self-organized value chain that continuously reallocates resources
as competition intensiﬁes and the rate of innovation accelerates.3 The implicit as-
sumptions or dogmas of the current business rescue culture contradict the acceler-
ating destructive forces of capitalism and therefore can be labelled as an
anachronism. Instead of focusing on the speciﬁc micro-level of the ﬁrm, insolvency
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I. Introduction
There has been critical discussion on whether the business rescue culture is an ap-
propriate tool for insolvent or failing ﬁrms.4 Although, in these papers, references
are made to “the economic business life,” these references are nonetheless often
loose, infrequent, classic, and not general.5 These contributions rarely consider,
among other things, innovation and competition, the value chains in the business
ecology, the speciﬁc characteristics of knowledge and its ﬂuid nature, and the co-
evolution of markets and ﬁrms. In other words, the complexity of daily business
life. Other factors like ﬁrm failure, existence, and sustainable competitive advan-
tage – the stylized facts of a ﬁrm in its embedded business ecology – also remain
invisible in these discussions.
In this article, we aspire to critically review the business rescue culture by ana-
lyzing its manifestations in both theory and practice. In the ﬁrst part, we look at
the reasoning behind the current European proposals regarding business rescue
and second chance. This results in a kaleidoscopic picture. It is unclear what busi-
ness rescue is, what its origins and purposes are, and which methods it embraces.
However, the core of this article is about the empirical world of business in general
(“the stylized facts”) that the current trend towards business rescue strives to ad-
dress. We confront the assumptions of business rescue with the stylized facts of
the business environment and show that the assumptions behind business rescue
(labelled as dogmas) are at odds with these stylized facts.
II. The Evolution of the Business Rescue Culture
In the Middle Ages, there were high stigmas and (penal) punishments when entre-
preneurs broke promises. Gradually more lenient penalties such as forfeiture of
civil or political rights became more common. Central courts then began to
4. See, for example, Australian Productivity Commis-
sion, Business Set-up, Transfer and Closure (2015), available
at: <https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/
business/report/business.pdf>; Bolanle Adebola, “A
Few Shades of Rescue: A Critical Assessment of the
Rescue Concept” (2014), available at: <https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2518387>;
David Burdette and Paul Omar, “Why Rescue? A
Critical Analysis of the Current Approach to Corpo-
rate Rescue,” in Jan Adriaanse and Jean-Pierre van
der Rest (eds), Turnaround Management and Bankruptcy
(Routledge, 2017) (211–237).
5. See Sarah Paterson, “Rethinking the Role of the
Law of Corporate Distress in the Twenty-First
Century” (LSE Law, Society and Economy Working
Paper No. 27/2014), available at: <https://www.lse.
ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2014-27_Paterson.pdf>.
Although Paterson asserts that the unifying aim of
the law of corporate distress is the facilitation of the re-
allocation of resources in the economy to best use,
no reference is made to the underlying economic
process. For an economics-oriented contribution,
see Jassmine Girgis, “Corporate Reorganisation and
the Economic Theory of the Firm,” in Bob Wessels
and Paul Omar (eds), Insolvency and Groups of Compa-
nies (INSOL Europe, 2001) (89–110). Girgis, how-
ever, refers to the rather classic static theory of
economic organization: the individual ﬁrm. Girgis
argues that the character of the ﬁrm has changed
from physical to intangible resources. The question
is whether specialized assets need to reside in a par-
ticular (insolvent) ﬁrm.
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acknowledge that debt enforcement should be directed towards the assets of a de-
faulter and less towards the person. In the Middle Ages, examples can already be
found of business rescue arrangements.6
Insolvency cannot exist without a world of credit.7 Increased lending and credit
was thus a driver of insolvency regimes.8 In addition, corporate limited liability im-
plies that in some cases, debts might not be paid. Both insolvency regimes and lim-
ited liability recognize that failure and loss of capital are not uncommon.
Sociohistorical, political, and economic factors have continued to shape insol-
vency regimes more and more towards the rescue culture. In essence, the history
of bankruptcy can be described as a development or enlightenment from debtor
repression to debtor protection and therefore a redeﬁnition of insolvency from
sin to risk, from moral failure to economic failure.9 Business rescue could thus be
seen as a logical extrapolation of this (more debtor friendly) trend. The American
approach of business rescue through the introduction of Chapter 11 greatly inﬂu-
enced the subsequent development of business rescue procedures in Europe.
Steadily, there can be seen a paradigm shift within Europe in legislative insolvency
reforms by moving away from the sacrosanct pay what you owe to the balanced pro-
motion of the continuity of companies in distress.10 Boon and Madaus, for example, give
an overview of the European efforts to “develop a shared perspective” on rescuing
distressed businesses.11
What is striking is the diversity of frameworks, principles, recommendations,
benchmarks, resolutions, guidelines, recitals, and the diversity of backgrounds.12
The business rescue idea seems to form the pillar connecting many diverse threads.
It is unclear what the meaning and content of constructs like rescue, or temporary
insolvency,13 are.14 The cumulative impact of these procedures simply expands the
deﬁnition of what constitutes rescue.15 This ambiguity means that the business
6. See Dave de Ruysscher, “Business Rescue, Turn-
around Management, and the Legal Regime of De-
fault and Insolvency in Western History (Late Middle
Ages to Present Day),” in Adriaanse and van der Rest
(eds), above note 4 (22–42).
7. Of course, problems are less severe if there is only
one creditor; so the focus is on the classical conﬂict be-
tween shareholders and debtholders. This is the stan-
dard approach in corporate ﬁnance. This approach
can be judged a misrepresentation, but it can also serve
as a benchmark. Creditors could buy the claims of
other debtholders and continue the business. Besides,
if conﬂicts arise between diverse debtholders, the ques-
tion is why a ﬁrm should use multiple creditors with di-
verse preferences.
8. Resulting in debt that existed long before money, for
which see David Graeber, Debt: The First 5000 Years
(Melville House, 2012).
9. See Catherine Bridge, “Insolvency – A Second
Chance? Why Modern Insolvency Laws Seek to Pro-
mote Business Rescue” (2013) Law in Transition 28.
10. Is insolvency law in search of a new paradigm?
Maybe, different conceptions are needed for insolvency
law to develop in a way that serves corporate and
broader social ends. See, for an elaborate study,
Vanessa Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and
Principles (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
11. Gert-Jan Boon and Stephan Madaus, “Toward a
European Business Rescue Culture,” in Adriaanse
and van der Rest (eds), above note 4 (238–258), 238.
12. The European Commission Recommendation C
(2014) 1500 ﬁnal of 12 March 2014 on a new ap-
proach to business failure and insolvency contains
two ideas: entrepreneurial rescue (a second chance
for the entrepreneur with a clean slate) or his vehicle:
business or corporate rescue. See also the Proposal of
the European Parliament and the Council
COM(2016) 723 ﬁnal 2016/0359 (COD) on preven-
tive restructuring frameworks, second chance, and
measures to increase the efﬁciency of restructuring, in-
solvency and discharge procedures, and amending Di-
rective 2012/30/EU.
13. Or over-leveraged ﬁrms. This qualiﬁcation implies
that a ﬁrm is viable and valuable.
14. Boon and Madaus, above note 11.
15. Burdette and Omar, above note 4.
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rescue idea can be used by many diverse approaches, spreading and reinforcing
the trend. The business rescue “principle” is seldom questioned causing the con-
cept to take on a life of its own. Many different justiﬁcations for business rescue
procedures can be found16:
• preserving viable enterprises;
• valuing entrepreneurship and competition;
• reducing the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis;
• preserving jobs;
• encouraging productivity/entrepreneurship;
• contributing to society;
• protecting a speciﬁc industry of strategic importance;
• harmonizing insolvency regulations;
• facilitating risk taking;
• cross-border cooperation;
• promoting ﬁnancial stability; and
• maintaining the (going concern) value of a business.
Each of these purposes, however, can be questioned. Continuing an insolvent
business could hamper competition and is insolvency not simply the result and con-
sequence of competition? Business rescue is thus an indirect way of subsidizing in-
solvent ﬁrms and preventing the inevitable. Preservation of jobs occurs when a
company is continued, but at what cost? Keeping a ﬁrm in business for employ-
ment purposes is neither rational nor a sound economic policy. Harmonization
and cooperation have nothing to say about the direction in which innovation insol-
vency regimes should develop. Valuing entrepreneurship and facilitating risk tak-
ing are justiﬁed by laying the blame for failure on the experiment (or business
model) rather than on the actions of the individual entrepreneur. This optimistic
hodgepodge17 – a recipe for all ailments – makes the dogma behind business res-
cue culture very attractive.
From these positive justiﬁcations, the implicit dogmas of business rescue can be
derived. Business rescue focuses on the continuance of the individual ﬁrm from a
value perspective. The ﬁrm is thus seen as the fundamental unit in the quest for
value. Failure is seen as abnormal and detrimental to this value creating process.
Valuable knowledge is lost when a ﬁrm fails; failure of the ﬁrm decreases the value
of the ﬁrm. However, business realities (stylized facts) contradict these implicit
dogmas. This will be shown in the next section by reviewing some business realities
or stylized facts. These stylized facts originate from an evolutionary-complexity
perspective and more closely correspond to business reality. The market is not only
an efﬁciency promoting mechanism but also an effective algorithm in selecting
16. See, for example, Boon and Madaus, above note
11; Burdette and Omar, above note 4; Bridge, above
note 9.
17. This approach can be labelled a garbage can
model in which problems, solutions, techniques, and
preferences circle, and are ﬂuid; solutions are in search
of different problems: Michael Cohen, James March,
and Johan Olsen, “A Garbage Can Model of Organi-
zational Choice” (1972) 17(1) Administrative Science Quar-
terly 1.
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viable ﬁrms and their speciﬁc knowledge and capabilities. This perspective will
shed light on the negative aspects of business rescue.
III. Stylized Facts of the Business Ecosystem18
A. Introduction
Insolvency law contains many trade-offs. Frequent references are made to eco-
nomic consequences of insolvency procedures with regard to the need to preserve
value, wealth and employment, and maintenance of innovation and competition.
Insolvency law is indeed a complex discipline. This is a reﬂection of both the com-
plex economy and diverse regulatory environments. But if this representation is ei-
ther wrong or unclear, business rescue culture is founded on the wrong
“assumptions.” Ultimately, insolvency law should mitigate conﬂicts, reduce uncer-
tainty, protect the interests of the legitimate stakeholders of the ﬁrm, and create an
equal level playing ﬁeld in which the aim is to increase the returns for creditors as
well as clustering and reallocating resources. Contributing to welfare and prosper-
ity is naturally a gigantic challenge. The way we conceptualize the economy inﬂu-
ences how insolvency law contributes to that.
It must be kept in mind, however, that the global economy is much more com-
plex than any other physical or social structure ever built by humankind.19 The
economy in general and ﬁrms and markets in particular can be considered as com-
plex adaptive systems.20 These systems describe interacting, information gathering,
and adaptive agents generating aggregate behavior. This evolutionary-complexity
view, which corresponds to the business reality, is the core of this article.21 Markets
and ﬁrms are two interacting, cooperating, and at the same time competing
18. “A stylized fact is a term used in economics to refer
to empirical ﬁndings that are so consistent (for exam-
ple, across a wide range of instruments, markets and
time periods) that they are accepted as truth. Due to
their generality, they are often qualitative”: Martin
Sewell, “Characterization of Financial Time Series”
(UCL Department of Computer Science Research
Note RN/11/01, 2011), 2. It is often a broad general-
ization, which may have inaccuracies in every detail.
Sewell uses this technique to give a broad description
of market returns. In this article, it is used to give a
characterization of themes circling around the business
ecology or ecosystem, representing the coevolution of
markets and ﬁrms. See also James Moore, “Predators
and Prey: A New Ecology of Competition” (1993) Har-
vard Business Review 75; James Moore, “The Rise of a
New Corporate Form” (1998) The Washington Quarterly
167; Marco Iansiti and Roy Levien, “Strategy as Ecol-
ogy” (2004) Harvard Business Review 68.
19. Eric Beinhocker, The Origin of Wealth: Evolution, Com-
plexity and the Radical Remaking of Economics (HBR Press,
2007), 6. The Global Competitive Index is made up
of 12 pillars of competitiveness with 112 variables, for
which see The Global Competitive Report 2015–2016
(World Economic Forum, 2016).
20. This was already recognized by Adam Smith, the
founding father of economics with his central tenets
of the invisible hand and unintended consequences.
Roger Koppl calls him “a man of system” or a “com-
plexity theorist with a Santa Fe vision”: Roger Koppl,
“Teaching Complexity: An Austrian Approach,” in
David Colander (ed), The Complexity Vision and the Teach-
ing of Economics (Edward Elgar, 2000), 104.
21. According to Beinhocker, complexity economics is
a better approximation of economic reality than tradi-
tional economics: Beinhocker, above note 19, Part
Two. See also Freek Vermeulen, Business Exposed: The
Naked Truth about What Really Goes On in the World of Busi-
ness (Pearson, 2010); William Starbuck, Michael
Barnett, and Philippe Baumard, “Payoffs and Pitfalls
of Strategic Learning” (2008) 66 Journal of Economic Be-
havior & Organization 7. Other important works in this
respect include John Holland, Hidden Order: How Adap-
tation Builds Complexity (Basic Books, 1995); Brian Ar-
thur, “Complexity Economics: A Different
Framework for Economic Thought” (SFI Working Pa-
per 2013-04-012, 2013); Ricardo Hausmann et al., The
Atlas of Economic Complexity: Mapping Paths to Prosperity
(Harvard Center for International Development,
2008).
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institutions. The distinction between them is ﬂuid, dialectic, and eclectic. Interac-
tions cause the “ﬂow” of knowledge through these institutions, and by these
interacting processes, knowledge is used, created, combined, disseminated, valued,
and tested.
In the following sections, some stylized business facts of the economy are taken
into consideration and lead to the conclusion that business rescue culture in gen-
eral does not match these stylized facts, is inappropriate, and should be questioned.
We do this in steps. First, we demonstrate that interactions and networks are
formed within or “form” the economy. The question is therefore whether the ﬁrm
is the right fundamental entity for an assessment of the business rescue culture.
This is exempliﬁed by the fact that the ﬁrm is an entity that crystallizes and dis-
solves. Furthermore, we evaluate whether accelerating movements in the compet-
itive landscape makes business rescue procedures a less effective tool. In addition,
we focus on the speciﬁc ﬂuid characteristics of knowledge. It is also shown that
value creation is highly uncertain: The market is the best way to test and value
knowledge instead of this occurring through market interfering insolvency regimes.
Finally, these themes are matched with the ﬁve dogmas of business rescue culture.
B. Stylized facts of the business ecosystem: complex networks of distributed knowledge
What are the essential determinants of economic prosperity? According to the Eco-
nomic Complexity Index,22 the wealth of nations is driven by productive knowl-
edge.23 The level of productive knowledge is reﬂected and embodied by the
diversity and complexity of a nation’s output. Because a nation’s output requires
capabilities, this output reﬂects the knowledge embodied in it. Individuals are lim-
ited in the things they know. The only way a society can hold more knowledge is by
distributing this knowledge widely.24
Markets and organizations allow the knowledge that is held by a few to reach
many. As Hanauer and Beinhocker state, capitalism as an experimenting economy
is not efﬁcient but wasteful. Capitalism’s great strength is its creativity that makes it
a hugely inefﬁcient and wasteful evolutionary process of trial and error.25 Accord-
ing to them, capitalism is an evolutionary, problem-solving system (thereby some-
times creating other problems). Wright views capitalism as an “information
metatechnology.”26 Ridley sees capitalism as a system of free trade, so that “ideas
can have sex.”27 The essence of capitalism is thus creating, using, testing,
22. See Hausmann et al., above note 21. An economy is
a system of coordinated distributed knowledge. The es-
sential characteristic of economies is thus not the divi-
sion of labor but the division of knowledge. See Jason
Potts, “Knowledge and Markets” (2001) 11 Journal of
Evolutionary Economics 413.
23. The idea of viewing an economy as a system of co-
ordinated decentralized knowledge is not new. See
Friedrich von Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Soci-
ety” (1945) 35 American Economic Review 519. The cen-
tral problem in this vision is utilizing and expanding
the knowledge potential. The Industrial Revolution
can be attributed to dense clusters (“chains of inspira-
tion”) creating useful knowledge. See Joel Mokyr, The
Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress
(OUP, 1992).
24. Societies can thus create superhuman results.
25. See Nick Hanauer and Eric Beinhocker, “Capital-
ism Redeﬁned” (2014) 31 Democracy Journal 33.
26. The guiding of Smith’s invisible hand needs an in-
visible brain. See Robert Wright, Nonzero: The Logic of
Human Destiny (Vintage Books, 2001), 48 and 198.
27. See Matt Ridley, The Rational Optimist: How Prosper-
ity Evolves (Fourth Estate, 2010).
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disseminating, valuing, and combining information and knowledge and rejecting
knowledge that is not considered productive. Markets and ﬁrms are two important
entwined drivers of this knowledge process. They support the emergent and self-
organized value chains.28
The economy can be considered a set of arrangements and activities by which a
society fulﬁls its needs.29 The number of possible recombinations is almost unlim-
ited. The whole chain of interactions transforms and evolves through a process of
variation, selection, and ampliﬁcation. As Schumpeter considers, capitalism is by
nature a form or method of economic change. The problem is, however, that this
is usually visualized as how capitalism administers existing structures, whereas the
relevant problem is how capitalism creates as well as destroys such structures.30
This process of “Neue Combinationen” is the centerpiece of economics, also called
creative destruction.
The ﬁrm is only a tiny fraction in a network of technology, capabilities, knowl-
edge, and value. It is therefore not an island.31 It takes a dazzling number of orga-
nizations and exchanges to create computers, televisions, to produce bread,32 or
even a pencil.33 Emergent and self-organized value chains are complex and contin-
uously reconﬁgured by entry and exit and also new combinations, divestitures, cos-
metic alterations, strategic shifts, breakups, acquisitions, and so on. In this mess,
prosperity is made.34
According to Foster, modern production systems are bewildering networks
ofconnections. Firms, industries, and economies are all involved in producing
and exchanging products. They do this in complex and interconnected ways,
28. “Value chain” is a concept from Michael Porter,
The Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior
Performance (Free Press, 1985). Porter’s concept is
focused on the internal activities but could also
embrace external activities. The question is what ex-
actly is connected: It could be knowledge, capabili-
ties, or technologies. See, for an exposition of the
way technologies evolve by way of combinatorial
evolution of its building blocks, Brian Arthur, The
Nature of Technology, What It Is and How It Evolves
(Penguin, 2009).
29. See Arthur, above note 21, 14.
30. See Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and De-
mocracy (1942) (Harper, 1975 reprint), 82–85.
31. See Håkan Hakansson and Ivan Snehota, “No
Business is an Island: The Network Concept of
Business Strategy” (1989) 5 Scandinavian Journal of
Management 187. George Richardson, “The Organisa-
tion of Industry” (1972) 82 The Economic Journal 883,
883–884, concludes that our “theoretical” ﬁrms are
islands; looking at industrial reality in terms of the
sharp dichotomy between ﬁrm and market creates a
distorted view of how the system (the complex pat-
tern of cooperation and afﬁliation) works. A single
ﬁrm is embedded in a context of many other ﬁrms;
this entity is exposed to horizontal, vertical, and diag-
onal forces. This creates unlimited threats and
opportunities.
32. This was already noticed by Allyn Young, “Increas-
ing Returns and Economic Progress” (1928) 38 The
Economic Journal 527, 537: “Notable as has been the in-
crease in the complexity of the apparatus of living, as
shown by the increase in the variety of goods offered
in consumers’ markets, the increase in the diversiﬁca-
tion of intermediate products and of industries
manufacturing special products or groups of products
has gone even further.” The representative ﬁrm loses
its identity in these complex, emergent, and self-
organized value chains.
33. Leonard Read, “I Pencil: My Family Tree as
Told to Leonard Read” (1958) (Foundation of
Economic Education, 2008 reprint). The pencil de-
tails its complexity of its own creation, listing its com-
ponents and the numerous people and processes
involved.
34. See Dane Stangler and Sam Arbesman, “What
Does Fortune 500 Turnover Mean?” (Ewing Marion
Kauffman Foundation, 2012), 26.
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and thus, the ﬁrm is only a very proximate unit of analysis.35 Wealth creation is the
product of a simple, but profoundly powerful, three-step formula being differenti-
ate, select, and amplify. Evolution can be viewed as an algorithm or an all-purpose
formula for innovation. Businesses are interactors; they “do the living and dying.”36
Most ﬁrms inhabit ecosystems that extend beyond the boundaries of their own
industry or domain. Businesses cannot evolve in a vacuum. They must attract re-
sources of all sorts to create networks37; this is what Arthur calls the (usually unrec-
ognized) complex nature of the meso-structure or business ecology.38 A ﬁrm
should be considered not as a member of a single industry but as part of a business
ecosystem (an extended systems of mutually cooperative and competitive organiza-
tions) that traverses a variety of industries. Moore argues that competition is
among business ecosystems, not individual companies, that largely provide the fuel
for cooperative network creation.39
In these self-organized value chains, it is connections that count (and not if these
connections are interorganizational or intraorganizational connections). These
ﬂows transcend the individual ﬁrm. Bundles of resources especially knowledge
“ﬂow” through these value chains and are attracted and repelled by ﬁrms. Useful
knowledge will in general be absorbed by other links in the value chain. These
knowledge diffusion and spillovers are the essence of capitalism. Knowledge is a
complex and slippery concept as it emerges through interactions and slips away
through these same interactions.
C. Some stylized aspects of the ﬁrm: an entity that crystallizes and dissolves40
In economic theory, the ﬁrm and its legal conception is usually considered to be a
stylized shell. This tends to obscure and deﬂect attention from more organic, social
processes of enterprising. These processes are much broader than the terrain of
35. See John Foster, “From Simplistic to Complex Sys-
tems in Economics” (2005) 29 Cambridge Journal of Eco-
nomics 873. This is the same conclusion as in the
evolutionary view that the ﬁrm is only an interactor.
Luis Araujo, Anna Dubois, and Lars-Erik Gadde,
“The Multiple Boundaries of the Firm” (2003) 40 Jour-
nal of Management Studies 1255, 1270, draw the same
conclusion: “Pattern of connections drives the develop-
ment of capabilities, neither ﬁrms nor capabilities
should be seen as discrete entities and interaction
amongst capabilities within as well as across ﬁrm
boundaries become central.”
36. An interactor is a design that has been rendered
from the possible designs and made real: Beinhocker,
above note 19, 11, 195, and 200. For a more elaborate
view, see Geoffrey Hodgson and Thorbjørn Knudsen,
“The Firm as an Interactor: Firms as Vehicles for
Habits and Routines” (2004) 14 Journal of Evolutionary
Economics 281. The central question is: What is the ba-
sic or fundamental unit of selection?
37. For example, Microsoft’s ecosystems contain some
7752 system integrators: Iansiti and Levien, above note
18.
38. See Arthur, above note 21, 16.
39. See Moore, “Predators and Prey,” above note 18.
40. There are many views on the ﬁrm, often dialectic
and eclectic, because of the diverse multileveled con-
nections between ﬁrms and markets: The ﬁrm is an
agent acting on markets, is enabled and constrained
or disciplined by markets, creates markets, is an alter-
native for markets, searches for opportunities in mar-
kets, and can be traded on markets. A ﬁrm
supersedes a market and is superseded by markets:
Tim Verdoes and Anthon Verweij, “A Critical Consid-
eration of the Corporate Rescue Culture: An Analysis
from the Perspective of Complexity Economics,” in
R. Parry (ed), Designing Insolvency Systems (INSOL
Europe, 2015) (73–90), 74. This theoretical diversity
resembles the complexity of the ﬁrm. The theories of
the ﬁrm contain a nested hierarchy of interconnected
multileveled ideas and assumptions: Paul Nightingale,
“Meta-paradigm Change and the Theory of the Firm”
(2008) 17 Industrial and Corporate Change 533. This com-
plex network of interconnected assumptions is in itself
a complex adaptive system representing a “theoretical”
business ecology.
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legally deﬁned “ﬁrms” and business enterprises that only weakly reﬂect them. The
ﬁrm should be viewed as a temporary coalition in order to obtain insights into the
dynamics of her crystallization and dissolution. It is necessary to get beneath the
stylized fact of the ﬁrm as a legal entity that has preoccupied economic theory.
Corporations are also nothing more than temporary coalitions of strategic deci-
sion-makers who assemble and disassemble structures of subsidiaries, associates,
strategic alliances, and joint ventures for the purposes of wealth creation. The ﬁrm
is temporary in the sense that business opportunities are time and place speciﬁc.
Firms’ linkages and markets simply wax and wane.41
The theories of the ﬁrm,42 business or management studies, strategy, and mar-
keting, and its legal conception are preoccupied with the more or less static, efﬁ-
cient, equilibrium entity.43 Success, growth, and survival of the ﬁrm and its
sustainable competitive advantages are taken for granted or considered to be the
normal outcome. However, a ﬁrm is not an efﬁcient outcome but the outcome
of an effective and efﬁcient (evolutionary) market algorithm. This follows the dy-
namic complexity view of economics that considers the many interactions in an
economy. The market can be considered a network of capabilities. The difference
between the market and the ﬁrm is and always has been ﬂuid.44
Both the legal conception and economic theory of the ﬁrm share the underlying
premise of the ﬁrm. Enduring success is (implicitly) assumed to be normal. How-
ever, failure or more generally disappearance is more normal than success. In fact,
success and enduring sustainability are abnormal. The tendency to overemphasize
successes45 and to rationalize them ex post46 is chronically endemic. In essence, the
overuse of the survivor technique distorts our understanding of the process that has
led to the present state of things and has affected several disciplines besides business
history. The thinking that many of the ﬁrms that now dominate the economy are
of ancient lineage or that some of today’s top ﬁrms were also at the top a century
41. See Michael Taylor, “The Firm as a Connected,
Temporary Coalition” (2004/05) Spaces.
42. The theories of the ﬁrm are centered around the
following three questions: why do ﬁrms exist? what
are its boundaries? and what is its internal organiza-
tion? These theories are more or less focused on the
equilibrium position. Some of these theories explain
the existence as “organizational successes while others
explain it in terms of market failures”: Nightingale,
above note 40, 560. The existence of the ﬁrm is a cen-
tral starting point. In general, the theories of the ﬁrm
fail to incorporate how ﬁrms arise, exist, change, and
fail. It could even be argued that ﬁrms do not really ex-
ist in these theories but only the underlying founda-
tions: transactions, resources, knowledge, and
capabilities. It is also possible to explain the emergence
of the ﬁrm (in general) in terms of ideas or memes:
John Weeks and Charles Galunic, “A Theory of the
Cultural Evolution of the Firm: The Intra-organiza-
tional Ecology of Memes” (2003) 24 Organization Studies
1309.
43. A problem of this transaction cost approach is the
focus on the “tasks of coordination, and that what is
being coordinated (i.e. productive knowledge) is inde-
pendent of organizational arrangements”: Araujo
et al., above note 35. It is about rationalizing – making
efﬁcient – the system, not what makes the system valu-
able. Business model considerations – how do busi-
nesses create, deliver, and capture value – do not
show up. This resembles Drucker’s famous quote that
“there is nothing so useless as doing efﬁciently that
which should not be done at all.” Thus, it is useless to
efﬁciently determine the boundaries of a ﬁrm when
the comprised activities do not create value.
44. The market and the ﬁrm are two extremes on a co-
ordinating continuum; there are many intermediate
hybrid forms of coordination.
45. Microsoft epitomizes the rational, calculating strat-
egy of success. However, its success was far more the
result of a series of accidents than of a far-sighted,
planned strategy; see Paul Ormerod, Why Most Things
Fail: Evolution, Extinction and Economics (Wiley & Sons,
2005).
46. See Philip Rosenzweig, The Halo Effect: … and the
Eight Other Business Delusions That Deceive Managers (Free
Press, 2014).
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earlier might lead to the assumption that giant ﬁrms are generally long-lasting. Yet
the stated observation is equally compatible with the hypothesis that some initially
small ﬁrms grow rapidly to become large, while corporate giants have in the end a
poor survival rate:
Our current knowledge of survivors dominates our impression of the typical experience,
and their triumphs are lionized, while the history of the failures is forgotten or consid-
ered untypical.47
According to Popper, failure is the norm of science. The truth of knowledge
cannot be proven and can therefore only be falsiﬁed. Failure is the way science
progresses.48 It is the single most important feature that all biological species share.
In fact, almost all species that have ever lived are now extinct. Economic theory is
too preoccupied with existence, rise, and success at the expense of addressing
death, decline, and failure.49 The main reason for business failure is that the world
is complex and in general unpredictable.50 It is like playing a game of chess when
the rules of the game change continuously, the players are unknown, and there is
no clear deﬁnition of winning. In other words, an inﬁnite game. Businesses have a
disadvantage because the portfolio and diversity of their business plans can never
be as large as contained in the market.51
On average, around 10% of all enterprises in the USA and Europe vanish
yearly.52 Daepp and others found that the half-life of more than 25000 publicly
traded North American companies was 10 years. Every 10 years, 50% of these
companies vanished.53 Stubbart and Knight challenge the meta-theory about suc-
cess and failure: Success is considered to be the “correct outcome.”54 When a ﬁrm
47. See Leslie Hannah, “Marshall’s ‘Trees’ and the
Global ‘Forest’: Were ‘Giant Redwoods’ Different?,”
in Naomi Lamoreaux, Daniel Raff, and Peter
Temin (eds), Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms, and Coun-
tries (University of Chicago Press, 1999) (253–294),
254–255.
48. “The failure rate of organisations may not be an in-
dication of system failure but of system success – just as
an abundance of refutations may be a sign of rapid sci-
entiﬁc progress.”: Richard Langlois, Economics as a Pro-
cess (Cambridge University Press, 1986), 56. “The
enormous turnover in business activity is a (healthy)
sign of a restless capitalism”: Stan Metcalfe, “Restless
Capitalism” (Momigliano Lecture, Rome) (2004), 188.
49. For this asymmetry, see Ormerod, above note 45.
50. There are severe limits of knowledge: “Firms have
very limited capacities to acquire knowledge about the
true impact of their strategies”: Paul Ormerod and
Bridget Rosewell, “How Much Can a Firm Know?”
(Volterra Consulting Ltd, 2004), 2; Starbuck et al.,
above note 21, concluding that strategic learning is
harmful as often as it is helpful. The future is created
by many interactions with many unintended
consequences.
51. “The world is too complex, the permutations too
many, for any single company to envision deﬁnitively
the transformations to come”: Moore, “Corporate
Form,” above note 18, 180.
52. See Ormerod, above note 45, 15, referring to the
Business Statistics of the American Advocacy Database
and the Business Demography Statistics of Eurostat,
available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Business_demography_
statistics> reporting a percentage of 8.7%. Failure of
ﬁrms is not a new and recent phenomenon: R. Hutch-
inson, A. Hutchinson, and Mabel Newcomer, “A
Study in Business Mortality: Length of Life of Business
Enterprises in Poughkeepsie, New York, 1843–1936”
(1938) 28 American Economic Review 497, who found that
only one-ﬁfth of business enterprises survived the
10 years and less than half of these enterprises survive
for another 10 years. “This high mortality rate of busi-
ness has long been recognized as one of the costs of a
system of free competition.” “Some of these failures
have been used as stepping stones to larger
enterprises.”
53. See Madeleine Daepp et al., “The Mortality of
Companies” (2015) 12 Journal of the Royal Society Interface
1.
54. See Charles Stubbart and Michael Knight, “The
Case of the Disappearing Firms: Empirical Evidence
and Implications” (2006) 27 Journal of Organizational Be-
havior 79.
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disappears, scholars, managers, owners (and lawyers and policymakers) ask: “what
went wrong.” Failure is considered to be anecdotal evidence of aberrations, blun-
ders, and other mistakes. However, failure is quite normal. The average life span of
organizations tends to be short. Meta-analysis has revealed that long-term survival
is a random outcome or an unattainable goal. Wiggins and Rueﬂi conclude that
“sustainable”55 competitive advantage and superior performance are very rare.
Firms with long enduring competitive advantage are statistical outliers.56 Usually,
outliers are viewed as a problem and discarded, because they distort variances and
central tendencies,57 but in case of business performance, they are seen as the cor-
rect outcome. Disappearance occurs frequently, even where brand names, assets,
and operations superﬁcially continue unchanged.58
These ﬁndings are consistent with the vision of an environment full of uncer-
tainties. An environment where long-term survival is simply problematic. Long-
term survival can be considered as a purely random outcome, due to the result
of interactions among many competing organizations.59 Performance and survival
of a ﬁrm are systemic and emergent outcomes. Success and failure depend on the
complex interdependencies and interactions among many ﬁrms and markets.
There are severe limitations to what extent a ﬁrm can know the effects of its
strategies.60
Greenwood and Suddaby have commented on the ﬁndings of Stubbart and
Knight.61 Some ﬁrms do survive for long periods. They have succeeded in
transforming their business model. The examples are numerous: Abercrombie
and Fitch transformed itself from selling guns to upscale casual wear for young
consumers, while Nokia transformed from a wood pulp producer into a producer
of mobile phones. It is doubtful whether these transformations were fully and de-
liberately planned in the strategic boardroom.62 It rather emerged from trying, ac-
quiring, and introducing new things. Many of these attempts resulted in failure.
55. David Sirmon et al., “The Dynamic Interplay of
Capability Strengths and Weaknesses: Investigating
the Bases of Temporary Competitive Advantage”
(2010) 31 Strategic Management Journal 1386, conclude
that even “achieving temporary (instead of sustainable,
TV/AV) advantage is more difﬁcult than previously
thought.”
56. Robert Wiggins and Timothy Rueﬂi, “Sustained
Competitive Advantage: Temporal Dynamics and the
Incidence and Persistence of Superior Economic Per-
formance” (2002) 13 Organization Science 82. This phe-
nomenon: a few exceptional performing ﬁrms can be
represented by a power law: Pierpaolo Andriani and
Bill McKelvey, “From Gaussian to Paretian Thinking:
Causes and Implications of Power Laws in Organiza-
tions” (2009) 20Organization Science 1053. Richard Foster
and Sarah Kaplan, Creative Destruction, Why Companies
That Are Built to Last Underperform the Market – and How to
Successfully Transform Them (Currency, 2001), 9, conclude
the same: “the golden company that continually per-
forms better than the markets, has never existed.”
57. Stubbart and Knight, above note 54, 96.
58. There are different labels for deﬁning and
quantifying the contraction of the number of ﬁrms:
“death,” “mortality,” and “disappearance.” The
overall meaning of these labels is that the basic
identity has been lost – the (legal) independent
entity does not exist anymore. We prefer dissolve
and crystallize because knowledge, capabilities, and
business modules are continuously reshufﬂed and
reconﬁgured along the value chains. Valuable mod-
ules will therefore in general be absorbed by the
market.
59. Stubbart and Knight, above note 54, 89, 91, and
98.
60. Ormerod and Rosewell, above note 50, 2.
61. See Royston Greenwood and Roy Suddaby,
“The Case of Disappearing Firms: Death or
Deliverance?” (2006) 27 Journal of Organizational Behav-
ior 101.
62. Nassim Taleb, Anti Fragile – Things That Gain from
Disorder (Penguin, 2012), Chapter 15.
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Change is no guarantee of success.63 This raises the question if an established busi-
ness is the optimal and appropriate mechanism to transform into other lines of
businesses. The dynamic or organizational capability approach seems to hint that
this is possible when companies are equipped with the right competences. Dy-
namic capabilities can be a partial hedge against obsolescence. Sometimes, how-
ever, “ad hoc problem solving” by the ﬁrm is the better strategy. Besides,
organizational capabilities – to sustain the peculiarities of the ﬁrm – contain their
own problems of inﬁnite regress and discontinuity.64
A more fundamental question is thus, why should a ﬁrm live forever? In a way, a
ﬁrm can be considered a tool, a machine that eventually is worn out. Organiza-
tions ought to last only until their functional utility is exhausted. This vision is pre-
cisely how business corporations were originally conceived: Most corporate
charters were granted not only for a limited period but also for narrowly speciﬁed
purposes.65 This resembles the limited time span of a business model. The emer-
gence of these mechanisms means that exit strategies are created. The question
whether a company should continue its business was seriously investigated in the
past. In essence, the limited time span of corporations was acknowledged.66 This
recognizes “the best or longest is the enemy of the good.”
Transforming a business means trying new things to leverage and prolong
existing assets. This is a kind of diversiﬁcation and could be detrimental for inves-
tors. Firms should focus and specialize because investors can more easily diversify
and mitigate their risks. This “stick to your business” is compatible with the vision
that discontinuity of ﬁrms creates the most value and not continuity.67 Creative de-
struction leads to value creation. Starting or reconﬁguring new business models
can sometimes be better done with a clean slate, freed from its yoke. The costs
of switching and turnaround/rescuing could be very high and detrimental for com-
plementary (existing) assets. The policy of keeping the corporation alive and thriv-
ing at all costs under all circumstances can be questioned.68 Maintaining the status
quo (and failure) could be an optimal policy.
Likewise, the same question can be posed if business rescue procedures should
rescue viable businesses. Creating new options can destroy the value of existing,
complementary assets. The costs of creating ﬂexible options to cope with decline
and future threats could be very high and may undermine the present business
model that still generates positive cash ﬂows. Keeping companies resilient or
63. And if a ﬁrm is successful, this does not mean that
the ﬁrm knows why it is so. Vermeulen, above note 21,
176, stresses the causal ambiguity that makes ﬁrms suc-
cessful: “The ﬁrm’s competitive advantage is difﬁcult
to imitate because the ﬁrm itself doesn’t quite know
what it does to be so good at it …”
64. See David Collis, “How Valuable Are Organiza-
tional Capabilities?” (1994) 15 Strategic Management Jour-
nal 143; Sidney Winter, “Understanding Dynamic
Capabilities” (2003) 24 Strategic Management Journal 991.
65. “So, for example, when the Hudson’s Bay Co. was
merged with the Northwest Fur Company in 1821, the
charter limited its ‘life’ to 21 years.”: Greenwood and
Suddaby, above note 61, 106.
66. See Greenwood and Suddaby, above note 61;
Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, and Richard
Squire, “Law and the Rise of the Firm” (2005) 119
Harvard Law Review 1335.
67. See Foster and Kaplan, above note 56.
68. See Nicholas Dew, Brent Goldfarb, and Saras
Sarasvathy, “Optimal Inertia: When Organizations
Should Fail” (2006) 23 Advances in Strategic Management
73.
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rescuing insolvent and/or ﬁnancially distressed businesses is therefore problematic
policies.69 Baldwin and Clark assert that capabilities are expensive, complex, and
risky investments. Although it is tempting to try to improve on all dimensions at
once, to do so is to invite disaster. Many restructurings, recapitalizations, and hos-
tile takeovers are directed at reversing investments in capabilities that outside in-
vestors view as beyond the company’s capacity to implement.70 In our time
frame due to the acceleration of innovation and the combinatorial explosion of
ideas, long-term viability is highly uncertain; future cash ﬂows could be – due to
the many future threats – too low and risky to justify the enormous investments
to cope with these uncertainties.
Our main conclusion is that dissolution of a ﬁrm and crystallization of other
ﬁrms/businesses and the resulting diffusion of knowledge are much more struc-
tural than assumed. Businesses and competitive advantage are temporary and
changed, failed, and dissolved businesses are the essence of capitalism and should
be considered reasons for not interfering and facilitating business rescue. The ﬁrm
is merely a ﬂuid membrane of pooled and clustered resources with dense interac-
tions – a vehicle or interactor shielded by corporate law.71 Thus, the ﬁrm is not the
fundamental unit or unit of selection. Schumpeter poses that every enterprise is
threatened and put on the defensive as soon as it comes into existence.72 Disap-
pearance is therefore a normal, necessary, and inevitable consequence that in prin-
ciple should not be countered by active business rescue procedures.
D. Stylized facts of competition and innovation: increasing intensity and rate of acceleration
It is recognized that ﬁrms are facing an increasingly complex and uncertain envi-
ronment because of intensiﬁed competition and the accelerating rate of innova-
tion.73 The “triumph of bits,” the “age of modularity,” and the “digital
convergence” open almost unlimited opportunities (and thus more threats),74 be-
cause knowledge can easily be copied, communicated, connected, coordinated,
combined, and competed with (through experimentation and innovation). More
software building blocks lead to bullish imaginable software combinations and
business opportunities of which the vast majority is useless. The chances that
knowledge will eventually be undermined by future developments will be higher
and higher.
This trend of intensiﬁed competition and/or accelerated rate of innovation is
revealed in different disguises, for example:
69. Also, because there are other problems involved
with this kind of “market interference” (see last
section).
70. Carliss Baldwin and Kim Clark, “Capabilities and
Capital Investment: New Perspectives on Capital
Budgeting” (1992) 5 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance
67, 80.
71. These boundaries provide buffering and bridging
functions; see Araujo et al., above note 35, 1257.
72. See Schumpeter, above note 30, 105.
73. See Martin Reeves, Simon Levin, and Daichi
Ueda, “The Biology of Corporate Survival” (2016)
Harvard Business Review 3.
74. See Carliss Baldwin and Kim Clark, “Managing in
the Age of Modularity” (1997) Harvard Business Review
84.
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• the expected life span of ﬁrms is decreasing75;
• there has been a rise in ﬁrm-level volatility76;
• the length of Schumpeter’s waves, product life cycles, competitive advantage
periods, and corporate longevity declines77;
• a secular rise in annual turnover in the Fortune 500 companies78;
• an increased delisting of companies79; and
• the increased pressure of capital markets to focus on short-term performance.80
The future existence of the ﬁrm is neither a given nor is it self-evident. Rescuing
a ﬁrm is troublesome because we cannot be certain if a company will be viable af-
ter a rescue attempt. The acceleration of changes will result in an even higher per-
centage of business failure recidivism. Business rescue has to cope with the
statistical problem of type I and type II mistakes: selecting the wrong type of ﬁnan-
cially distressed businesses. The hypothesis being tested is that the ﬁrm is viable.
Type I error occurs when this hypothesis is incorrectly rejected. A type II error oc-
curs when this hypothesis is incorrectly retained. As innovations accelerate and
competition intensiﬁes, the chances that an insolvent business is viable will dimin-
ish. Type II errors will occur more often in an accelerating economy. The statisti-
cal chance that the business model has become obsolete or is outdated will be
higher thus continuing a business will, more often than not, destroy value. In gen-
eral, the costs of business rescue will rise, the risks will increase, and the beneﬁts
will fall. Business rescue culture contradicts this development.
E. Stylized aspects of knowledge: non-rivalry and non-excludability
Marshall recognized that knowledge is our most powerful engine of production.81
Knowledge is clustered in (dense as well as loose organized) networks. Viewed from
the network or society, it is not important where the knowledge resides. Capitalism
is a mechanism that utilizes and expands the knowledge potential. This happens in
the interplay between the ﬁrm and the market and the networks they embody.
Knowledge is very ﬂuid and usually crosses the membranes of businesses easily.
Capturing or expropriating the value of knowledge means revealing it.
Knowledge has ever been an important element in business life, but nowadays,
its importance is more explicit. It is considered to be the most important kind of a
ﬁrm’s assets.82 Knowledge or software is
75. See Foster and Kaplan, above note 56.
76. See Diego Comin and Thomas Philippon, “The
Rise in Firm-level Volatility: Causes and Conse-
quences” (2006) 20 National Bureau of Economic Research
Macroeconomics Annual 2005 167. They also found that
the aggregate volatility declined.
77. See Mauboussin and Schay, above note 3.
78. See Stangler and Arbesman, above note 34, 26.
79. See Reeves et al., above note 73.
80. See Andrew Haldane, “Patience and Finance”
(Speech at the Oxford China Business Forum, Beijing,
9 September 2010).
81. See Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics
(Macmillan, 1920), IV.1.2, available at:<http://www.
econlib.org/library/Marshall/marPCover.html>.
82. See Paul Romer, “The Soft Revolution: Achieving
Growth by Managing Intangibles,” in John Hand and
Baruch Lev (eds), Intangible Assets: Values, Measures and
Risks (OUP, 2003) (63–94).
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a set of instructions, recipes, means or processes by which humans manipulate the phys-
ical world around them – to rearrange those resources – in order to create value.83
Knowledge is a complex and slippery concept because of its interactions and the
fact that it slips away. It is therefore in a state of constant ﬂux. Knowledge is a re-
source with special characteristics: It is mostly non-rival, non-excludable, and
therefore expandable or scalable. Petrol can be used once, but knowledge can be
used as often as needed.84 Therefore, knowledge is not a scarce resource. It offers
unlimited possibilities. Everybody can use it, because in most cases, others can
copy it. Knowledge can be integrated and combined with other knowledge, there-
fore becoming expandable and scalable.
When a business tries to capture the value of an idea, this knowledge will be re-
vealed and – if valuable and useful – it will be noticed by others. Useful knowledge
does not stay within the boundaries of the company, but it ﬂows out and in and is
used, created, transformed, and imitated. Because of “digital convergence” and the
lower costs of transmitting knowledge, the scalability of knowledge has increased
enormously. This also means that the threats and the chances that knowledge will
be undermined, surpassed, or superseded will increase. As Collis asserts, organiza-
tional capabilities (embodied knowledge) are vulnerable to threats of erosion, sub-
stitution, and above all to being superseded by a higher-order capability of the
“learning to learn” variety.85 Because of acceleration, the chances that knowledge
is “obsolete” will thus increase and the value potential of insolvent ﬁrms will
decrease.
Does an insolvent business contain valuable and or useful knowledge? In gen-
eral, the odds of it containing valuable knowledge are low. This is the reason for
its failure. The critical resources are often embodied in labor. Because of the digital
revolution, this knowledge is ﬂuid and slippery and can be integrated in other al-
ternatives. In fact, often the best (critical) alienable resource is usually the ﬁrst to
leave the company.86 This ﬂow of knowledge (also of failed ﬁrms) is the essence
of the economy. It could be that the business owns intellectual property, but does
it have value, can it be internally expropriated (in the insolvent ﬁrm), and does it
have external value?
It is possible that certain knowledge modules are valuable. But do we need to
capture the value of it in the temporary shell of the ﬁrm or can it be applied in
other directions? If knowledge does have value, why does it have to stick to the spe-
ciﬁc (failed) business? As Baird and Rasmussen state, many assets work equally as
well in one ﬁrm as another. In addition, assets that are tailored to a speciﬁc ﬁrm
may not represent a source of value but could be the source of failure.87 Besides,
83. See Michael Mauboussin, Alexander Schay, and
Stephen Kawaja, “The Triumph of Bits” (Credit
Suisse First Boston Corporation, 1992), 2.
84. Most knowledge or business models (of the captur-
ing value type) cannot be qualiﬁed as intellectual
property.
85. See Collis, above note 64, 143.
86. See Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales, “The In-
ﬂuence of the Financial Revolution on the Nature of
Firms” (CRSP Working Paper No. 525, 2001), avail-
able at: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=259537>.
87. See Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen, “The
End of Bankruptcy” (2003) 55 Stanford Law Review
751, 768.
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there are serious obstacles to capturing its value. Usually the risks and uncertainties
of capturing the value are high for insolvent ﬁrms. Stakeholders hesitate to con-
tinue a business because the present value of a new business turnaround strategy
is unknown in general but even more unknown and uncertain in case of an insol-
vent business. Stakeholders could be more or less forced to join the rescue, even in
case of a low chance of success. This creates the wrong incentives. In fact, it distorts
the competitive process because indirectly failed ﬁrms are subsidized. Firms can
thus free ride with other people’s money. This can in turn increase the ex ante ﬁ-
nancing costs in general if ex post investors are forced to continue the business.
Is (valuable) knowledge wasted if it is not used (captured) in the failed ﬁrm?
Again, the answer is no. Useful knowledge will in general be absorbed by the mar-
ket and settles down elsewhere in the value chain. Progress is not only fuelled by
successful but also by unsuccessful ventures. Failure is wasteful; however, there
are economic beneﬁts to offset the waste if the resources of the failed ﬁrms are
reallocated in the value chain. Failure – as the inevitable outcome of many trial
and error attempts – is beneﬁcial in three ways88: the selection effect (survivors
of a larger pool of entrants perform better), the competition effect (a larger pool
of entrants is a greater stimulus to innovation), and the spillover effect (knowledge
no longer appropriable by the failed ﬁrm may be captured by survivors’ ﬁrms from
spillovers). Valuable knowledge is not usually lost.
Failure is good! Failed entrepreneurs may be as heroic as successful entrepre-
neurs may.89 Although stickiness owing to embeddedness is sometimes an imped-
iment of diffusion of knowledge, ﬁrms provide beneﬁts to society that outlast
their existence. Governments should encourage innovation (start-ups), and success-
ful ﬁrms should actively incorporate resources of failed or failing companies in the
sources of innovations from which they draw. Integrating and combining knowl-
edge ﬂows from failed ﬁrms increases the performance and adaptability of ﬁrms
in a distributed knowledge system. Useful knowledge is not lost or as Hoetker
and Agarwal state that death hurts, but it is not fatal.90 Useful and valuable knowl-
edge will be noticed and absorbed by the market. With or without insolvency.
F. Stylized aspects of value and viability: (reversed) causality
Capitalism is a system or mechanism to test and value knowledge and information.
There are serious problems in this wealth creating process. This is better known as
the information paradox.91 This paradox arises in case of selling and buying busi-
ness ideas. What is the value of a business idea? The problem is that its (present)
value can never be known in advance. If it is certain, why was this not discovered
88. See Anne Knott and Hart Posen, “Is Failure
Good?” (2005) 26 Strategic Management Journal 617,
617–618.
89. Ibid., 617.
90. See Glenn Hoetker and Rajshree Agarwal, “Death
Isn’t Fatal: The Postexit Diffusion of Knowledge Cre-
ated by Innovative Companies” (2007) 50 Academy of
Management Journal 446.
91. See Kenneth Arrow, “Economic Welfare and the
Allocation of Resources for Invention,” in National
Bureau of Economic Research, The Rate and Direction
of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors (Princeton
University Press, 1962) (609–629).
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by someone else? Besides, the future is unknown as it is created and shaped by the
actions of many others. For valuing and selling an idea, the owner of that idea has
to inform and disclose it to an interested party. But the other party then immedi-
ately “owns” this idea. It has been acquired without costs.
The only way to capture the value of this idea is for its owner to execute the plan
and become an entrepreneur. A market has to be created to test and value the
idea.92 Because the idea has to be speciﬁc and distinctive, the required investment
is (partly) irreversible. The entrepreneur thus becomes immobile. Suffering losses
in case of failure is a logical consequence of this value creating process. To be suc-
cessful, the idea has to be revealed in an indirect way, which at the same time un-
dermines it. Capturing the value of an idea has the unintended consequence of
revealing and disseminating it. Success attracts other players. This knowledge pro-
gression process – through success and failure – is the unintended consequence of
entrepreneurial activity.
Suffering losses in case of failure is a natural and normal consequence of the
quest for value. Failure has many different disguises. Yet not all failures are lethal.
Business failure is associated with loss of value when the ﬁrm is liquidated, and the
synergy between the assets (the organizational capabilities) vanishes, resulting in an
assumed decline of value. But the question is whether this loss of value can be at-
tributed to bankruptcy and liquidation. There is a reciprocal relationship between
the viability and the value of a business. A viable business continues operations,
which means that the assets can be valued at going concern value. Thus, viability
inﬂuences value. But, on the other hand, if a company creates value, then it is also
viable. So value creation inﬂuences viability. This is the reversed causality.
The market value of the ﬁrm usually deviates from the going concern or book
value.93 This is usually recognized, especially in cases when the market value is
higher than the book value. The reason for this deviation is that, because of strict
accounting criteria, a balance sheet usually does not recognize intangible assets.
This deviation is recognized explicitly in cases of mergers and acquisitions. At that
speciﬁc moment, the market value reveals itself, but that does not mean that there
was no difference at an earlier moment. However, the market value can also be
lower than the going concern or book value in case of bad prospects and
underperforming expectations. This lower value is revealed in case of insolvency,
but it is wrong to attribute this to liquidation. Usually, the market value has already
gradually declined when a ﬁrm traversed its own downward spiral. It is not bank-
ruptcy that destroys value, but destruction of value that results in bankruptcy.
92. This could be the essence as well as the nature of
the ﬁrm: “The main problem (of explaining the crystal-
lization of the ﬁrm) is far deeper and arises from the
fact that the net present value of an idea, asset, or capa-
bility (advantage), cannot be known without factoring
in the very planned and emergent actions of a ﬁrm
and the impact of these on the eventual value of the ad-
vantage, and the way in which this value is being af-
fected/transformed as a result of the actions of other
market players, to include new entrants-competitors,
supplies and buyers leading to the co-creation of addi-
tional value”: Christos Pitelis and David Teece, “The
(New) Nature and Essence of the Firm” (2009) 6 Euro-
pean Management Review 5, 10.
93. For a listed company, this difference is visible: It is
the market capitalization minus the book value of
equity.
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Creative destruction does not mean destruction of value. Value is created by
undermining structures.
This causality can be elucidated by referring to the recovery ratio in case of a
bankrupt ﬁrm. In the Netherlands, the overall recovery ratio is 3.2%.94 Is this low
recovery ratio a sign of high bankruptcy costs? Markets are extremely inefﬁcient if
this is the case. How can it be possible that no one is able to sustain the value, assum-
ing that there is value? The difference is simply too big for a market inefﬁciency
argument. But there is another explanation: The value has already been lost in sight
of insolvency. The low recovery ratio is a reﬂection of the fact that the market value
is low. This argument does not require amarket inefﬁciency argument. The low and
declining value caused bankruptcy, not the other way around.
Another illustrative aspect is the low percentage of restarted businesses, cur-
rently 2.5% in the Netherlands.95 This could have been caused by market failures
as the market is not capable of capturing the value; this would (again) require a
very inefﬁcient market. On the other hand, it is also possible that there is no wealth
creating future for the ﬁrm. That means that insolvent ﬁrms are not viable. In the
USA, the percentage of restarted businesses is higher at 10%. Thus, it appears that
more debtor friendly insolvency proceedings save more value.
Comparison of these percentages  which is what economists and regulators
usually do – is not, however, appropriate, because it does not take the other ﬁnan-
cial institutions of a country into account. In the Netherlands, for example, small-
and medium-sized ﬁrms rely heavily on bank credit. Banks therefore possibly ﬁlter
out poorly performing ﬁrms at an earlier state, so only the least promising ﬁrms go
bankrupt. In addition, restarted businesses have a high chance of recidivism,96
which implies that these insolvent ﬁrms had no promising future prospects. If the
insolvent ﬁrm has value, in most cases, this value is not lost but reallocated. With
a more debtor friendly insolvency procedure, more businesses will be given the
beneﬁt of the doubt.97 Policymakers should not sustain and indirectly subsidize
the old but stimulate the new.
Besides, usually the rescue process requires some form of business valuation.
However, valuing is very subjective. The ﬁrm is a link in the value chain created
by many interactions; the (ﬁrm) value it creates can only be known ex post (and in
that case only partly and for a certain period). The viability of the ﬁrm can only
94. See Centraal Bureau Statistiek, “Faillissementen,
Oorzaken en Schulden 2015” [Central Bureau of
Statistics, “Bankruptcies; Causes and Debt 2015”].
This percentage is much lower than the 89.3% in
the Resolving Insolvency Section of the World
Bank’s Doing Business Report, available at:<http://
www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/resolving-
insolvency>.
95. See Centraal Planbureau, “In vier stappen naar
efﬁciëntere faillissementswetgeving” [Economic Policy
Analysis, “Four steps to improve the efﬁciency of insol-
vency regulations”] (2017).
96. Continuation of failed business shows high rates of
failure recidivism: Out of debtors that emerge as
continuing, independent entities under Chapter 11,
18.25% ultimately ﬁle for bankruptcy protection
again: Edward Altman and Ben Branch, “The Bank-
ruptcy System’s Chapter 22 Recidivism Problem:
How Serious Is It?” (2015) 50 The Financial Review 1.
97. The Dutch Council of State W03.14.0221/II Re-
port (2015) raised serious objections to the Dutch Insol-
vency Modiﬁcation (introducing a prepack
arrangement). The Council concluded that viability
and value are concepts that are unknown and too
subjective.
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be tested via markets. The essence of value creation is that it cannot be predicted, if
this is possible it cannot be created anymore! The business rescue process becomes
very subjective and manipulative,98 compared with the “old” more creditor-based
system:
At best, the valuation of an enterprise (…) is an exercise in educated guesswork. At worst
it is not much more than crystal ball gazing. There are too many variables, too many
moving pieces in the calculation of value (…) for the court to have great conﬁdence that
the result of the process will prove accurate in the future.99
IV. The (Implicit) Dogmas of Business Rescue Culture
In this article, the central focus is on the meso-structure level and not the microeco-
nomic perspective of the ﬁrm because the ﬁrm is not the fundamental unit in the
wealth creating process. Insolvency regimes should focus on this general meso-eco-
nomic landscape and create a neutral equal competitive playing ﬁeld. In this ag-
gregate spectrum, it does not matter where the knowledge resides, rather that it
should ﬂow, if necessary, to better opportunities. This happens with knowledge
of both solvent and insolvent ﬁrms. We should not focus on the entities but on
the connections between the elements: the value chains.
Business rescue procedures introduce many additional questions: What is it ex-
actly; what are its purposes; does it apply to a business, corporation, or an entre-
preneur; which methods does it include; what is a viable, and valuable ﬁrm; is
restructuring feasible; at what moment does it apply; who are the stakeholders;
which stakeholders are retained and which are shed; and who is in charge? These
questions imply that business rescue is subjective, arbitrary, and complex. There
are also a number of problems associated with business rescue: misuse, recidivism,
market disturbance, less competitive pressure, changing the access to and costs of
ﬁnance, and giving ﬁrms the beneﬁt of the doubt. Trying to stretch the insolvent
ﬁrm is indirectly subsidizing bad performing ﬁrms. In general, the law should
aim to reduce uncertainty and resolve conﬂicts. However, business rescue adds
to complexity and subjectivity. It seems as if business rescue is focused on the inci-
dental, speciﬁc ﬁrm on the short term, whereas insolvency law should focus on the
structural “general ﬁrm” and the long term.
Good arguments are needed to introduce and strengthen this kind of market in-
terference. Several (implicit) dogmas shift the balance even further and thereby re-
inforce the business rescue process. However, these dogmas could be questioned.
To summarize, there are ﬁve related dogmas of business rescue culture that culmi-
nate in an overarching dogma that can be derived from the different stylized facts.
98. See Diane Dick, “The Chapter 11 Efﬁciency Fal-
lacy” (2013) Brigham Young University Law Review 759.
99. In Re Mirant Corporation, 334 B.R. 800, 848
(Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Texas
2005); see Marshall Huebner and Damian Schaible,
“Valuation in Chapter 11: Overview and Tolls for
Consensual Resolution,” Chapter 2 in Global Legal
Group, The International Legal Guide to Corporate
Recovery and Insolvency 2009 (GLG, 2009), available at:
<https://www.davispolk.com/ﬁles/ﬁles/Publication/
6771a85a-00c8-4d69-b1fb-1b5263b2edec/Preview/
PublicationAttachment/3aca3008-f6c0-4c9d-addd-
1e5183e0b01a/INS09_Chapter-2_Davis-Polk--Ward-
well.pdf>.
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From Sections III. B and III. C, it can be concluded that networks or value
chains are the essence of the complex business environment. The difference be-
tween markets and ﬁrms is more ﬂuid than usually is recognized. Businesses crys-
tallize and dissolve. This brings us to the ﬁrst dogma:
1. The ﬁrm is the fundamental unit in the quest for value100
This dogma is shared with the legal conception of the ﬁrm,101 economic theory
of the ﬁrm, and business studies. The ﬁrm is an important vehicle for clustering
resources. However, it is only a temporal cluster embedded in a network of
capabilities. Businesses crystallize and dissolve as networks are reconﬁgured. The
connections of capabilities within the network are more fundamental than the ﬁrm.
A ﬁrm has less strict boundaries and more external ties than usually is recog-
nized. The ﬁrm is a temporary coalition that attracts and repels resources. It is
not necessary that (growth) opportunities should be executed under the current
membrane of the corporate veil. The static, efﬁcient, and strict boundaries view
on the legal and economic theory of the ﬁrm and business sciences do not corre-
spond to the complex economic forces of capitalism. These theories do not corre-
spond to the empirical and theoretical facts of ﬁrm turnover, mergers, failure,
emergence, serendipity, luck, mistakes, divestures, and alliances, which more re-
sembles (an evolving) complex business ecology. In business ecologies, or self-orga-
nized value chains, it is connections that count (and not if these connections are
interconnections or intraconnections). The focus should be on the (whole) value
chain, not on the individual ﬁrm.102 The changing links between the intervalue
and intravalue chains are the unknown outcome of an emergent self-organized
complex system. Business rescue is focused on the incidental, speciﬁc ﬁrm and
the short term; however, the focus should be on the general, structural ﬁrm in
the long run.
From Sections III. C and III. D, it can be concluded that ﬁrms do not have an
eternal life. The presence of the shield, shelter, or isolating mechanism of the ﬁrm
is severely limited in time. Besides, because of accelerating competition and innova-
tion, the average life span of a ﬁrm is decreasing. The second dogma is therefore:
2. Long-term survival is considered to be the normal outcome of the
quest for value
Here again, this dogma is shared with the economic theory of the ﬁrm, the legal
conception of the ﬁrm, and with business studies. However, prolonged survival of
ﬁrms is very rare; the business world is simply too complex. On average, 10% of all
100. This basic and “fundamental unit view” can be
questioned on philosophical (the ﬁrm is only an
interactor, a temporary vehicle), theoretical (the ﬁrm
is only a collection of transactions or resources, and
the ﬁrm is just a tiny fraction within a value chain),
and empirical (ﬁrms have no eternal live, disappear
frequently, and cannot in general create sustainable
competitive advantages) grounds.
101. This article focuses on the implicit dogma of the
individual business entity. Corporate groups consist of
more business entities, thereby creating more ﬂexibility
in changing the boundaries of the group.
102. Verdoes and Verweij, above note 40, 87.
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enterprises in the USA and Europe vanish annually. Failure (and change) is en-
demic and structural103; success is incidental and limited in time.
Businesses exist because they create limitations to be distinctive: They reduce
the environment and focus on a limited number of products, processes, or business
activities. Yet the number of potential threats is unlimited. Success comes from lim-
itations in different disguises, but failure comes, however, from unlimited possibil-
ities. Focus, specialization, and immobilization are reasons of existence in speciﬁc,
but failure in general. Failure is far more pervasive than existence and survival.
There are simply too many unknowns. The only way of selecting ﬁrms is through
testing by Smith’s “invisible hand.” The market extracts (in a biased but objective
way) poor performing, wealth-destroying ﬁrms out of a total business
population.104
Business failure is structural and endemic. Viewed from the ﬁrm in speciﬁc, fail-
ure conﬂicts with the basic premise of most of the ﬁrms’ stakeholders. So, from this
perspective, failure is a bad outcome, because stakeholders are inclined to believe
that the idiosyncratic resources of a ﬁrm embody a sustainable advantage. Con-
ﬂicts between stakeholders arise especially in case of insolvency, with severe emo-
tional reactions. Failure could be detrimental to the stakeholders, because
additional costs are incurred by reallocating their efforts, and investments that
could be written off. However, markets dictate whether a ﬁrm is sustained; the
cluster of idiosyncratic resources does not create value by itself. Value creation is
unknown and follows a process of trial and error.
For the system as a whole, creative destruction creates value; evolution is not fo-
cused on the individual ﬁrm, but on the aggregate performance. It does not matter
where the knowledge resides. In this process of trial and error, ﬁrms crystallize and
dissolve; the ﬁrm thus plays a subordinate role. This process is highly wasteful, but
that also applies to competition. To be distinctive and to outperform competitors
require high costs and investments.105 The market eliminates nonvaluable clusters;
thus, business turnover is a sign of system success. The result is a reallocation of re-
sources – especially into more valuable directions. This brings us to the third
dogma that can be derived from Sections III. B and III. F in particular:
3. Failure of the ﬁrm is bad
Failure is considered to be bad, because it is wasteful. However, this “waste” is a
necessary element of capitalism as a knowledge, problem-solving system. The
enormous turnover in business activity is a (healthy) sign of capitalism; in the
103. The endemic nature of failure can be justiﬁed on
philosophical (there are too many unknowns), theoret-
ical (the ﬁrm cannot cope with everything, is partly im-
mobile), and empirical (statistics show the frequent
disappearance of ﬁrms) arguments and by analogy or
abduction (extinctions in biology, falsiﬁcation in
science).
104. See Verdoes and Verweij, above note 40, 84. This
corresponds to the population ecology view of
organizations: Michael Hannan and John Freeman,
“The Population Ecology of Organizations” (1977)
82 Journal of Sociology 929.
105. Usually, competition in general is assessed more
positively because it is assumed that it increases efﬁ-
ciency and diversity. However, the same arguments ap-
ply to business failure. Besides, business failure in
general is a consequence of competition.
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coevolution of markets and ﬁrms, valuable resources are selected and allocated in
the self-organized value chains. Markets select poor performing (wealth-destroying)
ﬁrms through some form of creative destruction. But this restless capitalism has
positive consequences for the aggregate macro-perspective. A market’s primary
function, based on the complexity perspective, is to differentiate between valuable
and nonvaluable businesses. The reason why markets are so good at this is their
computational efﬁciency as distributed processing systems. Beinhocker asserts that
markets are almost pure evolutionary systems. Markets superiority in command
and control is attributable not to their efﬁciency at resource allocation in equilib-
rium but because of their effectiveness at innovation in disequilibrium.106
Business failure recidivism shows that it can be detrimental to sustain insolvent
ﬁrms. Besides recidivism, the rise of zombie ﬁrms is a new recent phenomenon.107
A zombie ﬁrm is a ﬁrm that is barely viable, but due to very low interest rates
and repetitive capital, restructuring is kept alive. This phenomenon has been
recognized as a key driver of slow productivity growth in Japan after the long
recession.108 Keeping alive zombie ﬁrms prohibits the ﬂow of resources to
more productive ﬁrms, creates an entry barrier, and crowds out innovative ﬁrms.
Failure of the ﬁrm and reallocation of its resources is not bad viewed from the
aggregate picture, continuing and stretching value-destroying ﬁrms is bad.
Preventing bankruptcy of insolvent ﬁrms could be detrimental for aggregate
productivity.
There is more variance of productivity within and across industries.109 Business
dynamism – entry and exit of ﬁrms – is a mechanism to improve allocative and dy-
namic efﬁciency of a country. It contributes to the restructuring and reallocation of
resources to more productive alternatives. The process of productivity growth re-
quires ongoing productivity enhancing reallocation. There is strong evidence that
this allocative and dynamic efﬁciency is critical for the aggregate economic perfor-
mance of a country despite the costs involved.110 This implies that valuable knowl-
edge of failed ﬁrms is not lost on average but reallocated. This spillover and
diffusion of knowledge is the unintended consequence of enterprising; this process
continuously undermines knowledge of solvent as well as insolvent ﬁrms. This fol-
lows from Section III. E and results in the fourth dogma:
106. Beinhocker, above note 19, 294.
107. See Bank for International Settlement, 87th Re-
port (Basel, 2017): a zombie ﬁrm is a ﬁrm whose inter-
est expenses exceed earnings before interest and taxes.
Müge McGowan, Dan Andrews, and Valentine Millot,
“The Walking Dead? Zombie Firms and Productivity
Performance in OECD Countries” (OECD Working
Paper No. 1372, 2017), 10, deﬁne a zombie ﬁrm as
old ﬁrms that have persistent problems meeting their
interest payments or more speciﬁc: ﬁrms aged
≥10 years and with an interest coverage ratio < 1 over
three consecutive years.
108. Ricardo Caballero, Takeo Hoshi, and Anil
Kashyap, “Zombie Lending and Depressed
Restructuring in Japan” (2008) 98 American Economic Re-
view 1943; Joe Peek and Eric Rosengrie, “Unnatural
Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation
of Credit in Japan” (2005) 95 American Economic Review
144.
109. Andrew Haldane, “Productivity Puzzles” (Speech
at the London School of Economics, 20 March 2017),
available at: <https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
speech/2017/productivity-puzzles>; John Haltiwanger,
“Firm Dynamics and Productivity Growth” (2011) 16
European Investment Bank Papers 116, available at:
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1984016>.
110. Haltiwanger, above note 109.
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4. Valuable knowledge is lost when a ﬁrm fails
The usual premise is that valuable idiosyncratic resources and capabilities are
lost if a ﬁrm goes bankrupt. However, valuable knowledge of failed ﬁrms is not lost
in general; it is usually absorbed and captured by other ﬁrms. Hoetker and
Agarwal conclude that death is not fatal because of knowledge diffusion.111 Knott
and Posen indicate that failed ﬁrms generate externalities that signiﬁcantly and
substantially reduce industry cost. On average, these beneﬁts exceed the private
costs of the (failed) entrants. Thus, failure appears to be good for the economy.112
In line with this dogma is the next. It seems as if transforming going concern
value into liquidation value wastes capital. However, this lower value is only re-
vealed at this speciﬁc moment. It is not that bankruptcy destroys value in general,
but that value destruction creates bankruptcy. This last dogma follows especially
from Section III. F:
5. Failure of the ﬁrm decreases the value of the ﬁrm
Markets separate underperforming from well-performing ﬁrms through an ob-
jective and neutral criterion (which can of course be biased): a ﬁrm that does not
pay its debt. The possible threat of insolvency disciplines the ﬁrm. This criterion
creates an objective equal level playing ﬁeld on the capitalist landscape. It could
be that insolvency proceedings have two pitfalls: the low debt-coverage ratio and
the low percentage of the failed ﬁrms that continue their business. From the per-
spective that the business is still viable and able to create and capture value, (static)
efﬁciency is the encompassing norm, failure comes suddenly, reorganization is
quick and easy, failure is only a temporal ﬁnancial problem and the resources
are less (or not) valuable in another alternative allocation, this statement could be
right. But these requirements are very, very strict. Is this selection bias (the insolvency
criterion) so strong that it destroys much going concern value on average?113 Failure
seems wasteful because liquidation value is lower than going concern value.
However, the ﬁrm as a source of value can also be a source of failure: “Bankruptcy
is not the cause of the decline in value of the ﬁrm; it is the result.”114
V. Conclusion
The overarching dogma is that the business rescue culture focuses too strongly on
the ﬁrm level; the ﬁrm in general, however, is just a tiny temporary factor in the
business ecology. Business rescue in general should cross the ﬂuid boundaries of
the ﬁrm. Insolvency procedures can be brought to a higher level by taking the un-
intended consequences of this aggregate level into account (e.g. removing compet-
itive pressures, distorting competition, and changing the level playing ﬁeld of
creditors). In 1776, Adam Smith “discovered” economics by introducing a higher
111. Hoetker and Agarwal, above note 90.
112. Knott and Posen, above note 88, 617–618.
113. See Verdoes and Verweij, above note 40, 85.
114. Alan Marcus, Richard Brealey, and Stewart
Myers, Fundamentals of Corporate Finance (McGraw-Hill,
2012), 459.
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societal level – the individual is led by an invisible hand to promote an end, which
was not part of its intentions.
The subtle unintended consequence of entrepreneurial delusion – business fail-
ure – is valuable for society but not at the individual ﬁrm level. Entrepreneurial
delusion115 is essential to the progress of our society; it is the engine of capitalism.
Business failure is a more positive, fundamental, important, and a common phe-
nomenon than we have hitherto acknowledged. Value creation is the outcome of
a complex and uncertain process of trial and error and creative destruction. The
costs of failure are the unintended consequence of a quest for solutions of societal
problems and needs.
Competition is usually considered to be a positive element of capitalism. How-
ever, competition is extremely wasteful. There are high costs and investments in-
volved in creating a speciﬁc distinctive valuable combination of idiosyncratic
resources. Business failure indeed is a wasteful phenomenon of capitalism too.
Competition and business failure are both parts of capitalism’s great strength: Its
creativity that by necessity makes it a hugely inefﬁcient and wasteful evolutionary
process.116 Besides, business failure is a consequence of a competitive process. It is
not clear why these elements are assessed so differently.
115. “American businesses are numerous yet fragile.
They enter and exit most industries in large numbers,
even where rational calculations about economic
incentives indicate ‘do not enter’ ”: Stubbart and
Knight, above note 54, 83.
116. Hanauer and Beinhocker, above note 25, 33.
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